The article looks at the case of the French technopole known as "Sophia Antipolis". After a brief description of the history and main dimensions of Sophia Antipolis, we look at the everyday life of social relations in the technopole. We argue that the everyday life of social relations in Sophia Antipolis, such as community life and living choices of the workers, are poorly developed and this may affect negatively the economic life of the technopole. Finally, in the conclusion, we compare Silicon Valley's model with Sophia Antipolis and we highlight similarities and differences.
Introduction
Social networks play a major role in the spread of knowledge, a key element of technological innovation (Powell e Groadal 2005; Lester e Piore 2004) . Local development research showed that social networks depend on the spatial proximity among firms, institutions and people (Trigilia 2005) . Since the Marshall's founding work (1890), spatial proximity has been defined twofold: (i) as agglomeration economies among firms and (ii) as interdependence between a community of individuals and a community of firms. First of all, in the classical model of industrial districts the spatial concentration of firms is decisive both for the genesis and the diffusion of knowledge.
Marshall talked of an "industrial atmosphere" as a function of territorial agglomeration, which generates positive external economies as well as specialized know-how. In industrial districts research (Marshall 1890; Becattini 1989; Capecchi 1990; Krugman 1991; Porter 1990 ), the competitive advantages of local social-economic systems have mainly been interpreted as a function of spatial proximity of economic agents. It is first and foremost the territorial embeddedness of firms which create particular forms of external economies, competitive advantage and endogenous dynamics (Hamdouch 2009 ).
Secondly, spatial proximity refers not only to economic agglomeration among firms, but also as interaction between "a community of people" and a "community of firms" (Becattini 1989 ). Hence industrial districts were considered "living places": not simple productive environments with horizontally integrated small and medium size firms, but also as distinct milieux where a specific community of people live and establish the greater part of daily social relationships (Sforzi 2005, 8) .
Therefore industrial districts were framed as "complete" (altough local) societies, with interdependence between economic structure, political institutions and civil society (Bagnasco 1999) . In any particular territory we could recognize both living places and productive places, as the result of how families, firms and institutions coordinated themselves and were organized over time.
The relevance of spatial proximity has drastically changed with the crisis of the industrial districts and the emergence of new forms of local systems (Crouch et al 2001) . As shown by Bellanca and Lombardi (2011) , the post-districts debate has widened the interpretative framework adding to the analysis of spatial proximity also cognitive proximity, whether or not firms shared the same knowledge base; organizational proximity if they shared common hierarchical control; social proximity, if they share interpersonal ties; institutional proximity if they worked within the same institutional boundaries (Boschma, 2005) . A shared feature of these four types is that the agents' interaction (either individual or collective) can occur independently of their spatial closeness (Amin-Cohendet, 2003) .
The reduced importance of spatial proximity can -given the previous twofold definition given in industrial districts literature -be understood in two distinct ways. Firstly, it can be interpreted as physical closeness between firms is substituted with a global supply chain, i.e., an integrated management system of physical and informational flows of a group of firms which participate in a value chain. In this case, other forms of proximity (cognitive, organizational, social and institutional) can support local development differently to industrial districts and can generate innovation which transcends geographical boundaries. Secondly, less spatial proximity implies the weakening of relations between "community of people" and "community of firms": e.g. between everyday life and technological innovation as well as between expressive and instrumental ties. The key idea of this paper is that innovation needs to be based upon "conversations", as outlined by Lester e Piore (2004) . Such "conversations" need an informal component as well as face-to-face interactions in specific "living places". As for many industrial business owners: "it is the very urbanity of their location that makes business possible and successful" (Curran 2010, 871, emphasis added).
To illustrate this argument the article analyzes the case of the French technopole of Sophia Antipolis. The analysis is based on secondary data, archive documents, analysis of internet sites, repeated periods of participant observations in the field, and twenty interviews of young workers from Sophia Antipolis. The articles is organized as follows: after a succinct analysis of the various definitions of a local system, the first part of the article describes the history and main dimensions of Sophia Antipolis. In the second part, we look at the everyday life of social relations in Sophia Antipolis, such as community life and living choices of the workers. These dimensions may be classified as "software" factors among success factors in research parks (1) (Kang 2004) . Finally, in the conclusion, we compare Silicon Valley's model with Sophia Antipolis and we highlight similarities and differences.
Local Development and Technology: Key Definitions and Common Elements
There is no one specific concept to univocally define the different forms of local development and technology. Markusen's (1996) definition provide a useful starting point to distinguish between different types of local systems:
− Classic industrial districts. These are Marshallian type of industrial districts, made up of small, horizontally integrated firms. Investment decisions are taken at a local level, the labor market is flexible, there is high inter-firms career mobility, a high level of immigration, a large amount of cooperation between competing firms and large proportions of workers involved in research and development activity. Social and cultural proximity is very important for sharing knowledge and most districts are rooted in their local historical and cultural heritage. Local government supplies collective assets for local firms.
− Hub-and-spokes: these are dominated by one (or more) large firms vertically integrated and surrounded by sub-contractors. Long term contracts are stipulated by the dominant large company and its suppliers; there is a less flexible internal labor market and an high degree of labor mobility.
There is a low level of cooperation between competing firms, associations are not very much diffused and public actors are keys in creating infrastructures. The dominant firm guides innovation and its influence can lead to "organizational inertia", which can cause adaptation problems during periods of economic crisis. 
Genesis of Sophia Antipolis: Institutional Entrepreneur and Field Evolution
Silicon Valley is a key reference model for the relationship between territory, innovation and development (Saxenian 1996; Granovetter et al. 2000) . The features of this local system fully correspond to the definition of a technological district provided by Lazaric, Longhi, Tomas (2004) .
Even if the conditions of its development are closely linked to the historical context, its success has made it the model to imitate throughout the world. In this respect, an emblematic case is the French
Technopole of Sophia Antipolis.
The initial events in the founding of Sophia Antipolis go back to 1969. The project's aim is illustrated in the name itself: Sophia is the name of wisdom in Greek, (3) while Antipolis is the ancient name of Antibes. The chosen area was in the environs of Antibes, close to Valbonne: this is a wooded area, which had been saved from the urbanization of the Cotes d'Azzure. Sophia
Antipolis was planned as a place which brought together economy, environment, research, science and art. The aim was essentially to give rise to a green area, in which "knowledge workers" of various cultures and profiles could meet and exchange their knowledge (Rasse, 2003) .
The first impulse for the creation of the technopole did not start from the public sector, but was rather a private initiative of Pierre Laffitte (4), a key figure for Sophia Antipolis. Indeed, not only did he conceived the project but he was able to involve other key actors in its making. It is well known that social structure can create benefits and strategic advantages which derive from bridging separate networks. Indeed, as Burt (1992) showed, "structural holes" positions in networks generate benefits and opportunities due to their structural characteristics: whoever belongs at the same time to separate networks gains an advantage, being a bridge over which information and resources flow, generating thus influence and arbitrating opportunities (Granovetter 2002) . Pierre Laffitte's position gave him the opportunity to connect otherwise separated networks, allowing him to play the role of institutional entrepreneur. Even given his undoubtedly charisma, it was his being part of both the network of engineers of the "Ecole des Mines" and the network of the French political class which gave him his tremendous influence. These initially separated networks, were linked thanks to Pierre
Laffitte's strategic position. In this way, his influence in the project was decisive not only for planning of Sophie but also for the second phase of implementation.
The voisines" (Bourdin 2003, 29) .
The entrepreneurial action of Pierre Laffitte was accompanied with parallel legitimization by key collective actors. The institutional entrepreneur is successful not only thanks to his ability to link otherwise separate resources, but also due to the support and legitimization of specific collective actors (Granovetter 2002; . As we can see in tab. 1, the organisational field of Sophia Antipolis became ever wider, varied and made up of authoritative political and economically active influential players who contributed to legitimize Pierre Lafitte's project. The evolution of organizational field went hand in glove with profound changes in the economic structure of Sophie Antipolis, which ceased to be a satellite platform to become a technopole to all effects.
From Satellite Platform to Technopolis
In 2008 (5), Sophia Antipolis had in 5,750 acres (corresponding to about 23 km²), 414 firms, 40% of which operated in the R&D sector, 30,000 workers of whom 54% employees, 5,000 students and 4,000 public sector workers. There are about 140 foreign capital firms or 11% of all firms in the technopole and 25% of jobs. Those working in the computer technology are about 13,100: 45% of jobs and 20% of firms in the park (6) . In 2008, even given the recession and general reduction of International investment, there were 225 new investment projects against 178 in 2007.
The economic backbone of Sophia Antipolis highlights three clusters. The first, the main one, involves computer science, electronics and telecommunications, and was to be the engine for area development and growth. The second, life sciences and health, developed more gradually and reached a relatively significant level, even if not quite as important as the first. The third cluster, natural sciences and the environment, was the first to develop in Sophia Antipolis but never went beyond its initial stage and presently involves only a small part of the area.
The development of Sophia Antipolis displays two principal phases. Until 1990, Sophia
Antipolis could not be defined a technopole, but rather a "satellite platform", according to Markusen's definition (1996) . In this context, proximity was reduced to simply physical closeness, and there was no "fertilisation croisée" yet. From 1991 to 1994 some important changes which were to revolutionize Sophia Antipolis occured. The exogenous event was the first cyclical crisis in information technology, with subsequent restructuring of the sector's industrial activity. The principal change was the transformation from an exogenous development model, based on the attraction of external firms, to an endogenous one based on internal resources and the development of local relationships between firms and research institutions. After the crisis, thanks to the emergence of professional networks and new collaborations among firms, the satellite platform was therefore transformed into a technopole.
Before the '90's, in Sophia, spin-offs were restricted to research institutions, but the crisis extended the phenomena to large companies. At the beginning of the 90's -just at a time when growth in jobs was collapsing and multinationals were beginning to downsize their personnel and sub-contract to external companies -there was a boom in the creation of small-medium size enterprises. There was a good number of spin-offs: small-medium size enterprises created by engineers who had previously been employed by large firms and who were reluctant to leave Sophia Antipolis after personnel down-sizing. From that point on, the new growth regime was no longer based on the capacity to attract external resources or state incentives, but was thanks to the human capital and social cooperation which had occurred over time (Quéré 2005) . These changes therefore shifted from an exogenous development model to an endogenous one, where relations between organizations (firms, research centres) were fundamental. Even given this, as we will now see, Pierre Lafitte's fertilisation croisée, the principal aim of the project, still remains on the drawing board.
Organizational Networks and Individual
Networks in Sophia Antipolis.
Organizational Networks
In Sophia Antipolis the creation of start-up benefits from vibrant organizational networks.
Let us take the example of "Gridpocket", a start-up just created by the Eurecom incubator, specialized in ecological solutions to save energy by mobile phones, digital TVs and internet
applications. An interview with Filip Gluszak, the founder of GridPocket (7), asked what were the benefits of being situated in such a rich environment. He replied:
Sophia Antipolis is a real mine of hi-tech skills, especially in the IT and telecommunications sector. But that's not all. It was surprising to find that all the firms have avant-garde capacities in energy management. We have already started some projects with research organizations at Sophia Antipolis and have had the opportunity to work together with some of the small-medium enterprises, large groups and local authorities in the region.
Another specification of the local networks are the "network forms of organization" (Podolny and Page 1998) as the case of SAME (Sophia Antipolis MicroElectronics). This is an association which aims to promote and develop the micro-electronic sector in the region. Founded in July 2004, it now has 30 members specialized in the sector. Its main task is the organization of an annual event, the SAME Forum, which aids meeting and exchanges between firms and specialized organisations in micro-electronics, helping to sponsor projects between firms and local organizations and promoting the study of science by students at University. The Forum attracts about 1,000 participants every year and is a key occasion for firms, start-ups and the academic world to meet. Public intervention also aims to create organizational networks. In the beginning, with the satellite platform, public intervention aimed above all at attracting big firms. Subsequently, with the transition to a technopole, public action was concentrated more on the creation of networks among local actors. An example of this is the activity of the Foundation Sophia Antipolis, which organizes monthly scientific thematic meetings open to whoever wants to participate. The organizational networks are therefore a important element of Sophia Antipolis model.
However, as we outlined previously, Pierre Laffitte's original project included also making a favourable environment for fertilisation croisée, above all in informal exchanges in everyday life, on the kind of a "Country Latin Quarter" or a "European Silicon Valley". This target fits with the idea that local systems are both "communities of people" and "communities of firms" and innovation also depends on the informal relationships in everyday life.
Sophia Antipolis Population: Housing Choices, Participation and Local Identity
The study of Sophia Antipolis's population is difficult due to the dispersion of the workers'
housing and the lack of a census. However, it is a fundamental element to understand everyday life in the technopole. Here, we will refer to the results of a sample questionnaire made by the Chamber For housing, only one worker in ten lives in Sophia as the results of the study "Sophia à la loupe" 2008 showed. In the initial project, the housing of workers at Sophia Antipolis were to be spread among the towns and village nearby and meeting centres within the park were to be created.
For this reason, cafes, restaurants, banks, travel agents and book shops were to be built in the centre along with amusement and cultural centres (such as playing grounds, exhibition halls) and public buildings (social services, post offices, town hall.) so as to foster fertilisation croisée. Subsequently, this idea was abandoned and the construction of housing within the park was allowed. However, most workers choose to live outside Sophia Antipolis. They live in the surrounding municipalities, Antibes, Nizza, Grasse, Cannes and Mougins: the park is considered a prestigious work place, but it does not attract residence as it hasn't the services which can be found in a city.
The research "Sophia à la loupe" also analysed the social life of the technopole's population. The interviewees were asked which services they felt were lacking: public transport was the main thing that was missing and was the main request for improvement. Indeed, in the technopole, whoever did not have their own car was isolated because outside working hours there were no links either between the various parts of the technopole, or between Sophia Antipolis and the surrounding towns. The other services which the inhabitants of Sophia Antipolis felt lacking were: a cinema, a swimming pool (the construction of one is planned for 2010, shopping centres (only in 2009 was a supermarket opened within Sophia Antipolis), a cultural centre and restaurants.
And so it emerged that the lack of services effectively hindered the creation of informal interpersonal relationships and therefore fertilisation croisée, which was conceived in the initial project. Most workers choose to live close to built-up centres where social life is richer: within the technopole there are few informal places to meet and cultivate relationships outside work environments. There are few bars and pubs, there is no cinema, theatre, discotheque and very few shops. Without a place to meet, the inhabitants of the technopole found they had to go miles to be able to meet in a more lively centre. This constituted a hindrance to the creation of informal networks and professional communities.
Both the 2005 and 2008 investigations confirmed the low participation of social life organized in the technopole: for example, one worker in three did not participate in any extraprofessional activity in the area. Who did, preferred sports activity to professional initiatives or anything which had to do with community life. The "Jeux de Sophia", an annual sporting event, was most popular event, while concerts and conferences involved a very low percentage of workers (respectively 10% and 15% in 2005) . Another symptom of the insufficiency of the place to create informal interactions was the fact that 20% of those interviewed in 2005 said they never went out in the evening, while more than 60% went out only once or twice a week (including the weekend).
Finally, Sophia Antipolis's workers have a rather vague idea of the history and institutional characters of the technopole. Most interviewees said they had little information about the history of Sophia Antipolis, but were interested in knowing more. Only 57% of interviewees recognised the logo of the technopole and 62% did not know the date of the creation of the site even if the celebrations for the 40th anniversary of the technopole were in 2009. However, 60% said they were 1 proud to work in Sophia. This percentage increased with the length of time worked in the technopole and for those who intended to stay there. In any case, most felt the work experience was very positive and that it improved their curriculum vitae.
Associations in Sophia Antipolis.
In Sophia Antipolis, the transition from exogenous to endogenous development went hand in hand with the growth of relationships between firms and research institutes. The professional associations which were created in the technopole helped this process. The first generation of associations in Sophia Antipolis were lobbies which aimed at creating an environment favourable to economic activity in the park. Subsequently, they aimed at creating a technological environment, of building networks and relations, all of which aimed at fertilisation croisée (Lazaric, Longhi and Thomas 2004) . There are 86 professional, cultural, sports and social associations in Sophia Antipolis. There are 29 professional ones and some of these are specifically aimed at creating fertilisation croisée. In particular, the Sophia Antipolis association, which then became the "Club des dirigeants" foundation and the Persan association were the first local associations of this type, which aimed to increase internal coordination between local professionals. Subsequently, they were followed with the creation of other thematic associations.
Many of the associations in Sophia Antipolis aimed to create local networks. In particular,
we have seen those which had the explicit objective of fertilisation croisée and creating informal ties. However, unlike the organizational networks we looked at previously, these collaborations had great difficulty in taking off. For example the Club Sophia Start-up, indicated on the technopole's web-site does not refer to the association anymore (9). This is an association which brought together private individuals with projects (scientists, students, researchers, engineers, teachers etc.), start-ups, firms, financial organizations, consultants and representatives of local institutions. The Club should had collect and distribute informations, aided collaborations on common projects, encouraged contacts between firms and organized monthly meetings and thematic dinners.
Another example is the Hi Tech Club, which is also indicated on the technopole web-site. We can say that there are initiative in Sophia Antipolis to promote fertilisation croisée in every day life but, in reality these have encountered great difficulty in reaching this objective. The initiatives taken did not create a context which aided useful outside work social links and so to create the Marshallian "industrial atmosphere" of widespread and spontaneous spread of specialized know-how.
4. Daily life in Sophia Antipolis
In this final part, we will look at daily life in Sophia Antipolis by reporting the results of a participant observation and twenty interviews carried out by the "Foyer des Jeunes Travailleurs".
The The interviewees were for the most part men between the ages of 24 and 38, who worked or studied in organizations of firms in the technopole's high-tech sector. They all worked in the IT sector and no one was originally from the Cotes d'Azzure. For most it was their first job after University. Their University had been a strong influence in attracting them to Sophia Antipolis: the collaboration between local research institutes and the academic world had been for nearly all of them the factor which had made them decide to come to Sophia Antipolis. It is also important to underline the collaborations between Universities throughout the world. This confirmed the role of weak ties created by work place collaboration as a resource for mobility (Granovetter 1983 ): many personal experiences confirmed that the present job at Sophia Antipolis was created thanks to previous colleagues.
A second factor was the international collaborations of the institute/firm for which they had
worked. There was a clear difference between collaboration of those working in research institutes and those in business. In the former case, all interviewees talked about a very open collaboration environment, while the latter did not know of any initiatives which involved other actors. All those who worked in firms were much more isolated. They all worked on projects which were unlinked in any way. Unlike what we would expect in a context which aids the creation of networks, their experience underlined the fact that competing firms did not want to make any contact with each other. Their offices were very close to other offices but every thing was done so that the employees did not meet. In the experience of the interviewees, the only organization with which their own company collaborated with was work agencies which recruited personnel. They all confirmed the scarce (or non-existent) involvement of organizational events to aid exchange in the technopole.
The only interviewee who had participated in such an event was in a Forum SAME one. His situation was however special in that he was the only one to have more responsibility as head of some projects in his company.
The analysis of life outside work gave a relatively homogeneous picture, confirming the quantitative data of the "Sophia à la loupe" study. All the interviewees underlined the difficulty of creating informal knowledge networks outside the work place. No one had ever taken part in associations or cultural groups or knew of their existence. The distance between housing within the technopole, the lack of meeting points and the related problem of rare public transport (limited to work days) meant the environment was very dispersive. People who choose to work in Sophia Antipolis for long enough moved outside the technopole, which was considered a work place and nothing more. There was very modest knowledge of and participating in events organized in Sophia Antipolis, even with people who had worked there for more than 4 or 5 years. However, as we have seen, there are many initiatives which have attempted to give life to "fertilisation croisée" by means of associations. However, these attempts tend to pilot the processes top down rather than aid the botto-up emergence of associations. The Foyer was the exception as it was a local association which concretely helped young people to meet who had just arrived in the region, giving thus an indispensable service.
The interviews showed not only a lack of identity with the place but also any sense of belonging to a professional community. Most relations at the work place not only do not generate spontaneous initiatives between colleagues, but struggle to grow outside the work place. This is also due to the dispersal of housing and the state of free time we have just seen. 
Conclusions
The development of the technopole aims at concentrating knowledge in a local milieu in which firms, institutions and people interact cooperatively to create a specific competitive advantage. As we have seen, one of the targets of the creation of Sophia Antipolis was to try to create "fertilisation croisée". According to Pierre Laffitte's project, the key leader of the process (10), this aim would aid technological innovation and scientific progress and would be the base of the success of Sophia Antipolis. The project has only partially fulfilled these objectives (Rasse 2003 Silicon Valley (SV) has been the recent reference point for advanced projects of local development to which Sophia Antipolis (SA) has been compared (Isaak 2009 ). Our research has confirmed Isaak's results, showing further differences in terms of the supply of collective assets for SA's competitiveness. The factors which lead to SV success can be reduced to three different types of local collective competition goods (Trigilia 2007 ):
• Collaborations between scientific and University structures;
• The availability of local partners able to supply goods and services for enterprises;
• The quality of the context.
In SA, there were many ticks for the first two points, while the most relevant differences between the French technopole and the Californian technological district is the quality of the general context.
The availability of suitably furnished areas both in terms of social-cultural and environmental factors has proved to be scarce. The differences between the two local systems are mainly linked to the presence (or absence) of these assets.
Isaak's analysis focuses in particular on the importance of creating a local professional culture able to produce technological and entrepreneurial innovation. This element is seen to be one of the principal factors of the success of SV, while SA has had difficulty in reaching the same objective. Unlike SV, there is no shared local culture in the French case and little sense of belonging to a professional community. SA is simply a work context, with no local subculture and most of the workers live outside the technopole as they do not feel to be part of a community.
SA was created by the work of an institutional entrepreneur with extended contacts which created institutional mobilization and then involved local institutions. Subsequently, the creation of new local actors and the localization of firms, research and educational institutes in the area allowed these actors to cooperate effectively. The social capital in the area mainly entailed formal collaboration between research organizations, Universities and institutions aiming to manage the development of the technopole, while a true professional community struggled to consolidate itself.
Widespread and spontaneous fertilisation croisée, which was one of the principal aims of Pierre Laffitte's project, has still to be achieved. The elements which block bottom-up development participation and the difficulty of informal collaborations are: dispersed housing, lack of services, insufficient transports, low participation in the technopole's organized events, the lack of a sense of belonging to the place and to a professional community, the isolation of company employees who see mainly their own work mates and who are not involved in any collaborative projects with other firms and few social projects.
SA could exploit its potential better if it were able to create more favourable conditions for a strong social capital in the every day life of the technopole. As we said in the introduction, a local system is also a "living' space" (Sforzi 2005) and not only a productive environment for firms. The SA area risks being cut off from the local society and creating almost exclusively work interactions. This is a weak point for a technopole as it creates discontent and a "brain-drain" towards richer social contexts. The social life in Sophia Antipolis lacks meeting places and many workers, even if they are satisfied with their professional condition, want to move to other areas and cannot conceive of their future life in the technopole. All this means external mobility which would lead to dispersal of the know-how accumulated locally. It therefore can be considered an obstacle to the creation of a professional community, innovative life-styles, long term projects and territorial innovation (Florida 2005 ).
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